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S OME of the trends indicated in last year's Survey were continued dur-
ing the current year. Again, a majority of the insurance cases appealed
during the year were decided favorably for insurers. Many turned on a
technical construction and application of the language in insurance con-
tracts. In addition, a number of decisions involved technical application of
rule 94,' Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Originally enacted as a reform to
require insurers to plead specifically by way of exceptions only those de-
fenses that are actually relied upon, rule 94 now appears to have been
thoroughly emasculated by court decision.
I. HEALTH, LIFE, AND ACCIDENT
A. Procedural Decisions
Pleadings. The prostitution of rule 94's spirit of reform is quite evident
in Sherman v. Provident American Insurance Co.' This case is the leading
candidate for the worst insurance decision from a procedural standpoint in
1967.' In this case the majority of the supreme court agreed that the thirty-
four policy exclusions and limitations plead by the insurer were "obviously
sham defenses" and that "to seek in this manner to frustrate the intended
purpose of rule 94 violates both its spirit and its letter."4 But the majority
held for the insurer because the insured had not made a procedurally proper
complaint about the "sham defenses." A dissenting opinion by Justice Nor-
vell, joined by Justice Smith, concluded that the results of the decision
"can only be described as a procedural miscarriage."' The dissenting
opinion described the insurer's answer as "one which had for its objective
the raising of fictitious issues contrary to the aims and purposes sought to
be accomplished by Rule 94.' On this basis the pleadings should have
been treated as a nullity, whether or not the plaintiff excepted to them.
The majority, however, did make one point of law clear. It found a
conflict between the holding of the court below and the holding in Old
Line Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Tilger.' The supreme court held that the
court below had correctly interpreted the Texas rule as placing the burden
of proof on the plaintiff-insured to negate all exclusions and limitations
in the policy which are pleaded as a defense by the insurer.
* A.B., University of Akron; LL.B., Southern Methodist University. Professor of Law, South-
ern Methodist University.
'TEx. R. Civ. P. 94.
2421 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. 1967).
a The court of civil appeals decision in this case was rated as the worst insurance procedural
decision in last year's Survey. Davis, Insurance Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 88,
105 (1967).
4421 S.W.2d 652, 653 (Tex. 1967).
5Id. at 656.
'Id. at 655.
7264 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
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Similar prostitution of rule 94 was also evident in decisions of the
courts of civil appeals. One court of civil appeals held a pleading (which
insurer labeled a special denial) that the plaintiff's loss was a direct re-
sult of bodily injuries effected solely and independently of all other causes
through external, violent and accidental means, cast the burden of proof
upon the plaintiff to prove the loss of his leg was covered by the policy.'
The policy was a group accident policy. The court reasoned that the clause
describing the general hazard insured against was not the loss of a foot,
but the loss of a foot effected solely and independently of all other causes
through external, violent and accidental means. This is the standard general
hazard insuring clause found in almost all accident policies.
The court cited one of its 1957 opinions construing a narrowly written
accident policy which insured against death only if injury should occur in
specified circumstances and from specified causes.! The court demonstrated
its misapprehension of rule 94 by stating that, if the insurer had relied
upon any of the policy's provisions listing the specific "limitations" of
liability, the insurer would have to plead and prove such defense. This
conclusion is contrary to the original concept of rule 94 which required
the insurer to specifically allege that the loss was due to a risk or cause
coming within a particular exception to the general liability, but continued
the burden of proof on the insured.
A related case1" illustrates a method which allows the insurer to use an
exclusion in a hospital and surgical insurance policy as a defense, while not
pleading the exclusion by special denial. The exclusion in question provides
that no indemnity was payable for loss resulting from skin grafts unless
performed within 180 days of an accidental injury. The insurer was noti-
fied prior to the expiration of 180 days that a skin graft operation would
be necessary, but the actual operation took place after the 180-day period.
The plaintiff pleaded that the insurer was notified within 180 days after
the injury that surgery would be required. The appellate court construed
this pleading as plaintiff's attempt to bring himself within the terms of the
policy. Apparently the insurer did not specifically plead the exclusion
to cast the burden of proof on the plaintiff under rule 94. But the court
permitted the insurer to achieve the same results. It held that the trial court
should have permitted the insurer to file a trial amendment after the plain-
tiff had introduced the insurance policy for limited purposes. The defend-
ant wanted the policy introduced for all purposes, including, of course, the
180-day exclusion provision."
Evidence: Rebutting the Presumption Against Suicide. In 1963, in
' Merriman v. Employers Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 416 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error
ref. n.r.e.
'Bethea v. National Cas. Co., 307 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
"American Bankers Ins. Co. v. Lovell, 415 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
" The court also upheld the insurer's contention that the trial court erred in rendering judg-
ment for the insured in any amount because there was no admissible evidence of probative force
to sustain a monetary judgment. The plaintiff failed to introduce evidence that the charges made
by the doctor for the skin graft were reasonable.
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Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Krayer," the supreme court
changed the applicable rule concerning evidence necessary to establish
suicide as a matter of law. The court in Krayer stated that, for a judg-
ment n.o.v. to be warranted on the issue of suicide, the presumption against
suicide must be conclusively rebutted by evidence upon which reasonable
minds could not differ; there must be only one reasonable inference to be
drawn from all the evidence. A recent court of civil appeals case" consid-
ered facts similar to Krayer, where there was no direct evidence that the
deceased did intend to commit suicide at the particular time and place in
question. While there was no direct evidence that the deceased did accom-
plish a suicidal intent by shooting himself in the head, all the circumstantial
evidence so indicated. In affirming the judgment n.o.v. for the insurer the
court of civil appeals concluded that, under Krayer, the jury necessarily
had to resort to pure fantasy and speculation to conclude that the deceased
died as a result of a gunshot wound which was accidentally inflicted.
Venue. A court of civil appeals had held that the term "loss" as used in
the Texas venue statute" means that the event which gives rise to liability
assumed under the policy has occurred." The insured's loss occurred when
he incurred hospitalization expenses. Suit was by the hospital to whom the
insured had assigned the insurance benefits. An attempt of the insurer to
transfer the case from the county where the insured was hospitalized to
the county of the insurer's home office failed. The insurer argued that the
word "loss" in the statute was used in terms of indemnity; that is, insured's
loss occurred only when the insured paid the hospitalization expenses and
sought reimbursement from the insurer." Nevertheless, the court held that
the suit was on the policy, not on the assignment, because the policy ex-
pressly provided that the insurer was liable to the insured for enumerated
hospital expenses and that the benefits would be paid to the hospital if so
authorized by the insured. The court properly treated the assignment as
merely the insured's authorization to the insurer to pay the benefits to the
hospital.'"
Res Judicata: Separate and Distinct Actions on the Same Policy. Another
hospitalization case" involved the question of whether a judgment for
insured in an action to recover hospital and surgical expenses incurred
during the illness of the insured's wife was res judicata as to two subse-
quent suits, one to recover for hospital expenses resulting from the in-
sured's broken collar bone. All of the suits were on the same policy. The
1"366 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1963).
" Rice v. Morris Plan Life Ins. Co., 407 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
4 TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 28 (1964).
"American Sur. Life Ins. Co. v. Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Institute, 408 S.W.2d 155 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1966) error dismissed.
16 This theory applies under the "no action" clause in an automobile liability policy providing
that no action should lie against an insurer unless as a condition precedent the amount of the in-
sured's obligation to pay shall have been finally determined. Insurer's plea of privilege on this
basis was upheld in Pioneer Cas. Co. v. Miller, 399 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
" A misconception of the nature of such assignments was noted in last year's Survey, Davis,
Insurance Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 88, 109-10 (1967).
"Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 415 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error dismissed.
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court of civil appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment that these were
three separate and distinct causes of action. The first action was not res
judicata and the three suits did not split a single cause of action into sep-
arate suits, even though it might have been possible for the defendant to
have consolidated the suits into one cause of action.
B. Substantive Decisions
Receipts for Premiums as Contracts of Insurance. In a case of first im-
pression in Texas, the supreme court in American-Amicable Life Insurance
Co. v. Lawson" held that a binding receipt is "interim" insurance and that
it is the only contract between the parties. A receipt, given for payment of
the first premium, included the cost of a double indemnity provision to be
included in the policy when issued. The application signed by the insured
was for a $25,000 policy with $25,000 double indemnity benefits. The
receipt provided that "the amount of the insurance becoming effective
under the terms hereof shall in no event exceed $25,000 less the amount
of all other insurance in force with the company."'" The insurer paid
$25,000 in life benefits but refused to pay the double indemnity liability
on the ground that it was not included in the interim insurance contract
set out in the receipt. The lower courts held that the provision in the re-
ceipt was ambiguous and construed it as a limitation only on the liability
of the insurance company for the life benefits and not as a limitation on
the double indemnity liability. The supreme court, reversing the lower
courts, found no ambiguity in the receipt or in the application for insur-
ance and held that the receipt did not incorporate the double indemnity
provision into the interim insurance.
In a related case before a civil appeals court a binding receipt was held
to be a valid contract of insurance where the insurer amended the applica-
tion for insurance and the applicant assented to the amendment. 1 The
decision followed contract principles by treating the application for insur-
ance as an offer by the applicant, the insurer's amendment of the applica-
tion as a counter-offer, and the applicant's assent to the amendment as his
acceptance of the counter-offer. Proof of the parties' agreement was aided
by the fact that the insurer's agent delivered the policy pursuant to the
amended application one hour after the applicant was injured. The case
might be considered an extension of contract principles to the binding
receipt problem following a recent court of civil appeals case,'" which held
a binding receipt valid as of its date when the insurer approved the appli-
cation in its home office, but attempted to revoke the approval when it
learned that the applicant died of a heart attack before the policy was
issued.
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Anderson" is a technical decision favorable




" Stansberry v. Legal Sec. Life Ins. Co., 410 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref.
n.r.e.
"Great Southwest Life Ins. Co. v. Henson, 401 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref.
n.r.e.
"3408 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
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to the insurer in construing a technically worded conditional receipt. Ap-
plicant's primary argument was that the insurer was estopped to deny cov-
erage. The application for the insurance was made on January 24, 1964. A
few days later applicant made the first premium payment and received a
conditional receipt. The applicant thought he was covered when he signed
the application and paid the first premium. There was testimony that the
soliciting agent told the applicant on this date that he was covered. The
applicant, in reliance upon the agent's representation, did not exercise a
conversion privilege in a group hospitalization policy issued to his former
employer which allowed him to convert his coverage thereunder to an in-
dividual policy without evidence of insurability. On February 18, 1964,
the plaintiff was hospitalized for several days, was discharged and then was
hospitalized again. He was finally discharged on March 13, 1964. On
March 12, 1964, he applied to insurer's agent for proof-of-claim forms
and was told his application of January 24 had been rejected. In reversing
the trial court's judgment, the court of civil appeals held that the alleged
representations made by the agent were contrary to the terms of the con-
ditional receipt and were beyond the agent's authority.
The instant conditional receipt was a "satisfaction type" receipt. The
insurer, after preliminary investigation, drew the policies and sent them to
its Dallas agent. The policies were never delivered to the applicant, ap-
parently because of a subsequent discovery of a poor medical history.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff did not rely upon the conditional receipt and in
fact by verified pleadings took the position that the conditional receipt
formed no part of the contract; that he did not execute, accept, or agree
to the conditional receipt; and that it was unilateral and without mutuality
of consideration. The appellate court held that these admissions were con-
clusive against the plaintiff and that no judgment based on the receipt
could be sustained. Additionally, the appellate court found that the appli-
cation signed by the plaintiff contained this provision: "Except as other-
wise provided in any conditional receipt issued, any policy issued shall take
effect as of its Policy Date, provided its delivery and payment of the first
premium are made while each person to be insured is living."" Since no
delivery of the policies was made, no contract of insurance was created.
Delivery. The case that wins the 1967 award for the worst insurance
decision of the year is Scott v. Industrial Life Insurance Co.' This case
involved credit life insurance, a type of insurance rarely dealt with by the
courts. One reason for this is that the loss ratio on such insurance is small;
consequently, there are few claims and chances of such claims reaching
court are small.
Lolithia Scott borrowed $3,000 at the Bank of Dallas and her note was
co-signed by her son, Jack. The bank required her to purchase credit life
insurance as a lender is permitted to do under Texas law." The bank held a
241d. at 338.
2 4 1 1 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
" TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.53 (1963).
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group credit life policy issued by the defendant, Industrial Life Insurance
Company, and put the insurance in force acting as agent for the insurer
and received a commission for the insurance. While the premium for the
policy was paid by withdrawing funds from Mrs. Scott's account, no
copy of a policy or certificate of insurance was issued to her. This failure
to deliver was in violation of the Insurance Code. 7 Mrs. Scott died while
the insurance was presumably in force.
The insurer's first defense was based on a limitation or condition in the
master group policy issued to the Bank of Dallas (but never seen by either
Mrs. Scott or her son) that the insurance should not take effect on the life
of any debtor who, on the date of the indebtedness, "is not alive and in
sound health."" s Mrs. Scott was not questioned about her health and did
not apply in writing for the coverage.
During the trial the insurer was permitted to file a trial amendment al-
leging that Jack Scott, instead of his mother, was the insured. This defense
was based on an additional condition in the master group policy that "In
no case shall more than one person be insured on account of any one in-
debtedness. If there is more than one Debtor .... the person to be insured
shall be the youngest of the Debtors."' The court of civil appeals held the
condition valid, adding that there was no waiver or estoppel by the insurer
and that, since co-signer Jack Scott was the younger debtor, he, rather than
his mother, was the insured. The effect of the decision was to bind the
Scotts to conditions of which they had no knowledge in a policy which
they never received. The failure of the insurer and its agent, the bank, to
deliver a certificate of insurance to Mrs. Scott or to Jack Scott was a viola-
tion of the Insurance Code. Section 6, article 3.53 provides:
... [G]roup Certificate of insurance shall be delivered to the insured debtor.
Each individual policy or group certificate ... shall . . . set forth . . . the
identity by name or otherwise of the person, or persons, insured, the full
amount of premium or the total identifiable insurance charge, if any, to
the debtor, separately for credit life insurance and credit accident and health
insurance, a description of the coverage, including the amount and term
thereof, and any exceptions, limitations and restrictions, and shall state that
the benefits shall be paid to the creditor to reduce or extinguish the unpaid
indebtedness . . .,,0
If the certificate of insurance had been delivered, there would be no
question about who was the named insured. Also, the Scotts would have
known about the conditions concerning the health of the insured. Had they
known of these conditions and been dissatisfied with them, they could
have purchased other insurance.
The Applicant: "Good Health;" "Sound Health." The supreme court in
Great American Reserve Insurance Co. v. Britton"t construed a life insur-
271d. §§ 6, 10 (Supp. 1967).
2'411 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
29 Id.
'TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.53, § 6 (Supp. 1967) (emphasis added).
3l 406 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. 1966). For further discussion, see Teofan, Commercial Transactios,
this Survey, at footnote 51.
1968]
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ance policy providing that "the policy shall not take effect until it has
been delivered to its owner during the lifetime and good health of the
insured .... ,2 The insured had "heart trouble" or "angina pectoris." The
majority opinion stated the requirement that the insurer prove by pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the applicant was not in good health when
the policy was delivered, declaring that such a finding is essential to the
insurer's right to cancel the policy or to its defense against an action for
the policy proceeds. The jury found that the applicant was in good health.
The court stated that the true question on appeal was whether the evidence
established conclusively, according to recognized legal standards, that the
insured was not in good health. The majority examined medical testimony
concerning the applicant's "heart trouble" and the Webster's Third New
International Dictionary definition of "angina pectoris." Noting that the
policy requirement of good health does not mean "perfect health," the
court reasoned that the question becomes how "seriously" the "heart trou-
ble" affected the health of the applicant generally and how "materially" it
increased the risk of death. The majority concluded that "to hold the good
health provision of the policy was breached as a matter of law we would
have to take judicial notice that the nature of one or more of the ailments
was such as to seriously affect the soundness of Britton's health or to ma-
terially increase Great American's risk. These are relative matters, and ex-
cept in extreme cases should be left for jury determination from the evi-
dence introduced on trial."33
The court distinguished Texas Prudential Insurance Co. v. Dillard,4
where the applicant had epilepsy in its most serious form when the policy
was delivered. This epilepsy was the cause of death. On that proof the
insurer established breach of the good health provision as a matter of law.
In Britton, the court found that the evidence did not conclusively establish
a serious infirmity when the policy was delivered nor was death from "an-
gina pectoris" conclusively established.'
A court of civil appeals relied upon the Britton'" case to hold that a dia-
betic was in sound health." The sound health provision in the body of the
policy was as follows: "This policy shall take effect on the date of issue pro-
vided the assured is then alive and in sound health and free from accidental
injury.""8 The insured suffered from diabetes when the policy was issued,
but the diabetes was under control. The cause of death of the insured was a
massive subdural hemorrhage caused by a fall from a scaffold.
The court found the evidence sufficient to sustain the trial court's finding
that the insured was in good health at the time she took the policy and cited
31 id. at 903.
3
3 Id. at 905.
34158 Tex. 15, 307 S.W.2d 242 (1957).
" Three dissenting judges urged that it is common knowledge that an angina pectoris patient
who must take nitroglycerin tablets to dilate the blood vessels cannot be said to be in "good
health." This minority opinion looked to the Oxford Universal Dictionary to support its view that
angina pectoris is a dangerous and serious disease.
36 406 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. 1966).





Britton as authority. The insurer apparently advanced a theory of fraudu-
lent misrepresentation predicated upon the fact that the application did not
reveal that the applicant had diabetes. Rejection of this theory by the court
appears sound under the misrepresentation statute which relieves insurers
from liability where the insured has misrepresented material facts.' How-
ever, the policy did make sound health of the insured a condition prece-
dent to the existence of the policy.' There is authority that the statute does
not apply to such a provision. The appellate court in the instant case relied
principally upon the supreme court's construction of the statute in Lane v.
Travelers Indemnity Co.,"1 an action on a fire policy, which held that the
insurer must secure findings that any misrepresentations were material.
A court of civil appeals considered a hospitalization insurance policy
limiting coverage to: "Any sickness which results in a surgical operation
shall be covered only if the cause thereof originated after this policy had
been in force for six months." 2 In measuring the six-month period the
question was whether the sickness originated when it first became mani-
fest or when it had its medical origin. The insurer argued that the follow-
ing jury instruction "re-wrote" the insurance contract: "[T]he cause of a
sickness or disease originates where such sickness or disease first becomes
manifest or active; and not necessarily at the earlier time when the medi-
cal cause of the disease may have begun or had its origin."'" The court of
appeals approved the instruction stating that the trial court "employed an
explanatory technique of placing in juxtaposition an inclusive and exclu-
sive statement; saying positively that a disease originates when it first be-
comes manifest etc., and highlighting such instructions by excluding the
idea that a disease originates when its medical cause begins."" This case also
held that an assignment of benefits to the hospital was not an assignment of
the insurance contract. Therefore, the insured had an interest in the policy
and was a proper party to bring suit. This sound reasoning may be con-
trasted to the erroneous conclusion reached in a recent case 5 noted in last
year's Survey.4"
a"TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.16 (1963).
40Southern Sur. Co. v. Benton, 280 S.W. 551 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926).
41 391 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. 1965). In Lane there was a property description in the fire policy
that the insured property was to be occupied as a "dwelling, tenant." The property was not occu-
pied by a tenant; it was occupied by its owners. The court of appeals held that the description
was a contractual warranty and its falsity relieved the insurer of liability. The insurer took the
position before the supreme court that the statement was a warranty, and that the truth of the
matter warranted was a condition precedent to the validity of the contract and therefore the policy
never became effective. Chief Justice Calvert stated that if the provisions of the policy were in-
tended to relieve an insurer of liability because of mere misrepresentations, without proof and
finding of materiality, it ran afoul of article 21.16. He also said that the statute is applicable
whether the exonerating policy provision be that the contract "shall be void" or only that the
insurer "shall not be liable." Lane is important for its discussion concerning the distinction be-
tween warranties and representations and that statements on a Texas standard fire insurance policy
descriptive of the policy are representations and not warranties.
"




' Dallas County Hosp. Dist. v. Pioneer Cas. Co., 402 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)
error ref. n.r.e.
"Davis, Insurance Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 88, 109 (1967).
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Another court of civil appeals upheld a summary judgment for the
insurer where the evidence was undisputed that the insured's "heart mur-
mur" was either manifest before the policy's effective date or where there
was a distinct symptom from which one learned in medicine could diagnose
the sickness."7
Contract Interpretation. In Southern Life and Health Insurance Co. v.
Simon" a limited industrial accident policy which required that insured
be "legally traveling" inside a steamship was held not to cover a longshore-
man operating a motor-driven truck for the purpose of loading a moored
steamship. The truck crashed through a hatch covering on the shelter deck
of the ship and crushed the insured to death. In a case of first impression
the supreme court reversed and rendered the judgments of the lower courts,
finding no ambiguity in the language limiting coverage. Looking to the
purpose of the policy, the supreme court found that the policy was in-
tended to provide benefits for losses to travelers or pedestrians by acci-
dental means. The longshoreman, engaged in moving from point to point
inside the ship in the loading operation, was not "legally traveling" inside
the ship under the reasonable intention of the policy. Coverage was also
denied under a second condition which was limited to injuries received
while driving or riding in a motor-driven truck on a public highway, since
the accident occurred inside the steamship and not under the usual and nor-
mal transportation circumstances over a public highway.
In another case49 where particular language in a contract was interpreted
for the first time, a court of civil appeals held that an airplane pilot hold-
ing a student pilot certificate was not a "licensed or certified pilot" within
the meaning of a life insurance policy provision. The insured was killed
while traveling in an airplane piloted by the holder of a student pilot cer-
tificate. The certificate had printed thereon in large letters: "Passenger
Carrying Prohibited." The court held that the term "duly licensed or
certified pilot," as used in the policy's provision which limited liability to
instances where the insured was a "passenger" on an aircraft operated by
such a pilot, necessarily refers to a pilot who holds a license or certificate
authorizing him to operate an aircraft carrying passengers. A person hold-
ing a student pilot certificate prohibiting him from carrying passengers is
not such a pilot. This opinion has added significance in view of the supreme
court's "error refused" approval.
Payment of Proceeds.
Possibility of Adverse Claim. The supreme court in McFarland v.
Franklin Life Insurance Co." considered the specific question of whether a
beneficiary could recover a twelve per cent penalty and attorney's fees
47 Abel v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 410 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
4416 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1967).
49 Mang v. Travelers Ins. Co., 412 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref.
5°416 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. 1967). For further discussion, see McKnight, Matrimonial Property,
this Survey, at footnote 31.
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under article 3.62"' where the insurer refused to pay the policy proceeds to
the designated beneficiary. The insurer pleaded that it anticipated a claim
from the widow of the insured and demanded that the beneficiary secure a
release from the widow. The court awarded the penalty and attorney's
fees to the beneficiary, holding that the insurer did not have reasonable
grounds for anticipating rival claims.
The insurer has a duty to investigate the validity of all rival claims to
the proceeds. Investigation, which could have been made during the
thirty-day period allowed by article 3.62, would have disclosed that the
policy was taken out while the insured was unmarried and that all pre-
miums were paid by the named beneficiary (the insured's mother) and
her husband. The widow did not have a valid claim and there was nothing
to warrant a belief that she did. The insurer was not justified in requiring
the beneficiary to obtain a release from the widow and the insurer was
under no duty to explain the failure to furnish a release. The court stated:
"The mere possibility that facts giving rise to an adverse claim could exist
does not constitute reasonable grounds for refusing to pay the designated
beneficiary."",
Anticipatory Breach. In Continental American Life Insurance Co. v.
McCain' the insured recovered judgment for a principal sum of $2,400,
representing twenty-four monthly payments of $100. Not all of the
monthly installments had accrued when judgment was entered. The court
of civil appeals upheld the judgment of the trial court on the ground that
there had been an anticipatory breach of contract by the insurer." The
supreme court reversed, without granting writ of error,"s and remanded
the case to the trial court with directions to enter judgment for the insured
as though no anticipatory breach had occurred. The court found the hold-
ing of the court of civil appeals in conflict with its decision in Sanders v.
Aetna Life Insurance Co.6 and distinguishable from its decision in Uni-
versal Life & Accident Co. v. Sanders.7 The Aetna decision emphasizes that,
to have an anticipatory breach of an insurance contract, the insurer must
have taken the position that it was repudiating the policy rather than
denying liability under provisions of the policy."
One case turned upon the distinction between a breach of the contract,
which the insurer conceded, and a repudiation of the contract, which it
denied." ' The insurer claimed the insured, who ruptured a disc in his back
by picking up a joint of tubing, did not suffer accidental injury because
he intended to pick up the tubing. The court of civil appeals held this
"TEX. INS. CooE ANN. art. 3.62 (1963).
5' 416 S.W.2d at 381.
5416 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1967).
"McCain v. Continental Am. Life Ins. Co., 412 S.W.2d 666, 672 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
'Under its authority, TEX. R. Civ. P. 483.
56 146 Tex. 169, 205 S.W.2d 43 (1947).
57 129 Tex. 344, 102 S.W.2d 405 (1937).
aSThe opinion did not mention the requirement of "just excuse" for the insurer to deny
liability. Lack of a "just excuse" was the basis for holding an insurer liable for an anticipatory
breach in Continental Cas. Co. v. Vaughn, 407 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
See the discussion of Vaughn in the. text accompanying note 59 infra.
'Continental Cas. Co. v. Vaughn, 407 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
1968]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
contention was so utterly untenable and arbitrary that it was without "just
excuse" as found by the jury. The principal authority relied upon was
Universal Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Sanders."° The court also upheld
the award of attorney's fees based in part upon the amount granted to
plaintiff for the anticipatory breach. 1
Beneficiary: Putative Wife. The question of whether the designation by
a husband of his putative wife as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy
is a legal fraud on the legal wife was raised in one case."2 The insurers paid
the proceeds of the policies into the court when suit was brought by the
legal wife; the putative wife was impleaded. It was presumed that the
policies were purchased with community funds, there being no showing
otherwise. The court of appeals, citing Brown v. Lee,"5 stated that pro-
ceeds from a policy purchased with community funds are community in
character; that where a named beneficiary other than the wife survives, a
gift of the policy rights to such beneficiary is presumed to have been in-
tended and completed by the death of the insured in the absence of a show-
ing of fraud. The trial court's summary judgment for the putative wife
was remanded for a determination of the fact issue as to whether the gift
of the policy proceeds to the putative wife was fraudulent to the legal wife.
II. FIRE AND CASUALTY
Fire Policy Endorsement. A court of civil appeals" considered a "General
Change Endorsement" adding the name of Hensley, the purchaser, as a
named insured at the time of the execution of a contract of sale of the in-
sured dwelling. The seller's policy provided coverage of $24,000 on the
dwelling and $5,000 on household goods while in the main dwelling, the
seller's furniture having been removed. The insurer took the position that
the only property sold under contract was the dwelling; therefore, the pur-
chaser's household goods were not included in the general change endorse-
ment.
The court of civil appeals held that the endorsement made the purchaser
a "named insured." The policy covered the main dwelling while occupied
by the owner and covered household goods of a named insured while lo-
0 129 Tex. 344, 102 S.W.2d 405 (1937).
6" Another point of interest in the opinion was the introduction into evidence of the stipulation
of the life expectancy of the plaintiff. This was justified on the basis that it merely informed the
jury of the usual life expectancy of persons of the plaintiff's age and was some evidence which
the jury might consider although the jury was not bound to measure the plaintiff's life span by
the mortality tables.
The trial court's order discounting the award of the jury at the rate of six per cent per annum
for 20.8 years, the life expectancy of the plaintiff, was reversed. The amount of reduction which
should be made is solely within the province of the jury. The court reasoned that the suit for
anticipatory breach of an insurance policy is not a suit upon a contract but is a suit for damages
for the breach. In a suit for damages the instruction in a damage issue "if paid now in cash"
directs the attention of the jury to the element of present value and the extent to which a jury
actually discounts the "damages" is peculiarly within the province of the jury. Texas Consol.
Transp. Co. v. Eubanks, 340 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) error ref. n.r.e.; Texas &
N.O.R.R. v. Flowers, 336 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
2 Alexander v. Alexander, 410 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). For further discussion, see
McKnight, Matrimonial Property, this Survey, at footnote 59.
6 371 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. 1963).
6 4 Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hensley, 414 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
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cated in the main dwelling. The endorsement did not exclude coverage of
household goods of either party so it was susceptible to a construction al-
lowing recovery."
Breach of Endorsement as a Defense. An interesting and educational
opinion was written by a court of civil appeals"0 summarizing the history
and application of the "anti-technical" statute"7 which was enacted to pre-
vent fire insurance companies from avoiding liability for loss and damage
to personal property under technical and immaterial provisions of the fire
policy.
The fire policy, insuring a cotton-picking machine against various risks
including loss by fire, bore a stamped endorsement providing that the
"cotton pickers insured under this policy are limited to custom farming
within a radius of 50 miles from the principal place of garagement." The
cotton-picking machine was damaged by fire while 150 miles from its
principal place of garagement. The insurer denied liability urging that,
since the insured's admitted breach of endorsement could not have con-
tributed in any way to the loss, the breach did not come within the terms
of article 6.14. That article has been interpreted in McPherson v. Camden
Fire Insurance Co."6 to apply only in instances where the breach might
have contributed to the loss; it has no application to a clause which is
material to the insurer's risk, the violation of which could not, from the
very nature of the provision, contribute to the loss. In the latter situation
the policy provision could be urged as a defense by the insurer irrespective
of article 6.14.
The insured's position was that this was the type of provision the
breach of which might have contributed to bring about the loss, but which,
as a matter of fact, did not. The court of civil appeals opinion gives nu-
merous examples of provisions coming within or outside the anti-technical
statute applied to the endorsement in question and affirmed the judgment
for insured since the breach did not contribute to the loss.
The insured also urged that the provision was a limitation of coverage.
The court rejected this argument; in order to be a limitation, the language
used must be positive and unequivocal not as a condition for insuring the
property but as to the insurance coverage afforded. 9
Breach of Promissory Warranty by Insured. In a case of first impression
in Texas a court of civil appeals construed the provisions of a "Jewelers'
Block Policy" and decided that a breach of promissory warranty by the
insured was a valid defense to the insurer against a claim of loss of jewelry
through burglary."0 When applying for the insurance the insured signed a
GaTrahan v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 155 Tex. 548, 289 S.W.2d 753 (1956); Providence
Washington Ins. Co. v. Proffitt, 150 Tex. 207, 239 S.W.2d 379 (1951)
66Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carnes, 416 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error
ref. n.r.e.
"
7 TEX. INS. (ODE ANN. art. 6.14 (1951).
68222 S.W. 211 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1920).
9 Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Alonzo, 112 Tex. 283, 246 S.W. 84 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923).
70Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Lang, 416 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.
1968 ]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
proposal that the proportion by value of property on his premises that
would be kept in a locked safe would be sixty-five per cent; the propor-
tion outside of the safe would be thirty-five per cent. Burglars broke into
the premises and stole jewelry and other property outside of the safe. In
rendering judgment for the insurer, the court of civil appeals held that that
the jury's finding that the insured had locked in his safe sixty-five per cent
by value of all property insured under the policy to be contrary to the
weight of evidence.
The warranty involved was a "promissory warranty" because it required
the insured to do something after the date of the policy." The insured
urged the application of article 21.16."M This statute provides that an-
swers made as part of an application for insurance if untrue or false are not
defenses to the contract unless it be shown on trial that the matter mis-
represented was material to the risk or actually contributed to the loss. The
court held the statute inapplicable because it does not apply to promissory
warranties." The court further concluded that the breach of the promis-
sory warranty was in fact material to the risk and contributed to the loss.
It was material to the risk because without the warranty the insurance com-
pany would not have issued the policy at the premium charged. It con-
tributed to the loss because the only property stolen was the property out-
side of the safe. The court concluded that the facts on this not being in
dispute, the promissory warranty was material to the risk as a matter of
law.
Non-Waiver Agreement as a Defense. In an interesting opinion the su-
preme court, by divided vote in Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. v.
Orkin Exterminating Co.,"4 held that a "non-waiver agreement" prevents
waiver of rights of the insured accruing under the policy before the time
the non-waiver agreement is made and that if the insurer had waived a pol-
icy defense prior to the non-waiver agreement such agreement does not
affect the waiver.
The insured had been previously held liable to Gulf Coast Rice Mills for
damage caused by application of a chemical called lindane, a pesticide used
by the insured in the rice mills facilities."5 Orkin, the insured, paid the
judgment and demanded reimbursement from the insurer. The insurer de-
fended upon the ground that Orkin's activity with respect to the chem-
ical was not an accident within the meaning of the policy and that, even if
it had been an accident, the insurer had an absolute policy defense because
insured had not given notice of the accident "as soon as practical" as re-
quired by the policy. The incident occurred in August 1955. Notice was
not given until May 24, 1956.
The court disposed of the defense of "no accident" by holding that the
"' Home Ins. Co. v. Henderson, 263 S.W. 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
"
2 TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.16 (1951).
3 Home Ins. Co. v. Henderson, 263 S.W. 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
74416 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. 1967).
7S Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Gulf Coast Rice Mills, 362 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962)
error ref. n.r.e., cert. denied, 375 U.S. 57 (1963).
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insurer was bound by the findings and the final judgment in the Gulf
Coast Rice Mills litigation. That case had held that the application of lin-
dane by Orkin in August 1955 had been negligence. The supreme court
construed the term "accident" as used in the policy to include negligent
acts of the insured causing damage which is undesigned and unexpected.
The court reversed the court of civil appeals' judgment for the insured
and remanded the case to the trial court to determine the fact question as
to whether the insurer had waived its defense of notice.
The inquiry with regard to the issue of waiver is whether the conduct
of the insurer shows "an intentional relinquishment of a known right or
intentional conduct inconsistent with claiming it.""6 The fact question was
raised because the insurer assumed the complete investigation and adjust-
ment of the Rice Mills claim for thirteen months after the insured had
given notice of the accident. At no time between receipt of notice of the
accident and execution of the non-waiver agreement had the insurer in-
dicated in any way that it denied coverage under the policy. The insurer
did more than merely obtain facts concerning the accident. There were
conferences with the attorney for Gulf Coast Rice Mills and conferences
with Orkin, the insured. All these acts were taken after the insurer was
aware that it had an absolute defense to liability on the policy.
High Water Exclusion as a Defense. An insured with extended coverage
on his property for loss caused by windstorm, hurricane and hail argued
that the destruction of his pier at lake Texoma by a windstorm and waves
caused by the high wind did not come within the policy exclusion that the
insurer shall not be liable for loss "caused by . . . tidal wave, high water,
or overflow, whether driven by wind or not; . . ."" The jury found that a
windstorm was the proximate cause of the damage, but the trial court
entered judgment n.o.v. for the insurer. The insured argued on appeal that
the damage was done by waves created by high wind and that such waves
do not constitute "high water" within the exclusion. The evidence was
that the level of the lake was not appreciably higher when the storm
struck, and at the time the storm struck the lake was below flood level. The
court of civil appeals, relying upon the supreme court decisions in Hard-
ware Dealers' Mutual Insurance Co. v. Berglund"8 and Coyle v. Palatine
Insurance Co.,"' affirmed the trial court's judgment for the insurer.
In answer to the argument that there is a distinction between "high
water" and "wind-driven water," the court of civil appeals said that
Berglund and Coyle made no such distinction. This answer is not particu-
larly persuasive because the distinction was not urged in either of those
cases. Berglund involved hurricane Carla which created high water. The
precise decision in Coyle was based on stipulation of facts by the parties.
The parties agreed that "the combined action of wind and water" caused
76416 S.W.2d at 401.
7 Wheelock v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 414 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref.
n.r.e.
78393 S.W.2d 309 (1965).
79222 S.W. 973 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1920).
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the damage and that "it is impossible to determine to what extent each was
an element or factor" in causing it. In Coyle Chief Justice Phillips said,
"The effect of this is clearly to exclude the loss in controversy from the
indemnity provided by the policy. That indemnity was only against direct
loss or damage by the wind."8
Coverage of Liability to Third Party. The insured took out a compre-
hensive liability insurance policy which provided coverage for certain lia-
bility injury and property damages."' The insured's business was described
as "oil producing and oil well drilling." The insured entered into an oil and
gas lease with owners of real estate, the lease containing a provision that the
insured should be liable for any damage to growing crops caused by the oil
well drilling operations. The property owners were successful in a suit
against the insured for damages to the land caused by a blowout of the oil
and gas well drilled by insured. The opinion in the landowner's suit stated
that the "suit was based on breach of contract and not one of negligence.""
A specific exclusion in the policy provided: "(e) under the liability cov-
erage, to liability assumed by the insured under any contract or agreement
except liability of another assumed under a written contract relating to
the premises." The court of civil appeals held the loss fell within this ex-
clusion since the final judgment in the landowners's suit was conclusive as
to the nature of that action. The insured argued that the insurer should be
liable under the doctrines of waiver or of estoppel. This argument was re-
jected under the rule that waiver and estoppel cannot create a new and
different contract with respect to risks covered by the policy.83
Coverage: Title Insurance. In a case of first impression a court of civil
appeals upheld the insured's claim of damage for the reduced market value
of real estate purchased by the insured due to the existence of an un-
known easement and waterline underneath the property.84 The title insur-
ance policy contained a description of the property which did not mention
the easement nor indicate the existence of the waterline, but the descrip-
tion did refer to the map and plat of the property on record in the office
of the county clerk with the statement, "to which reference is here made
for all pertinent purposes." The recorded map and plat showed the water-
line easement. The insurer contended that the reference in the policy to the
map and plat "for all pertinent purposes" constituted an exception and ex-
clusion to the insured risk. The court upheld the trial court's judgment
that the description of the land in the title policy was for the purpose of
identifying the land covered by the policy and not for the purpose of lim-
iting the insurance protection purchased.
The court stated that the nature and the purpose of the insurance con-
" Id. at 975.
81 Employers Cas. Co. v. West, 410 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
82 West v. Carpenter, 366 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) error ref. n,.r.e.
3 Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Craddock, 130 Tex. 251, 109 S.W.2d 165 (1937).




tract was to insure and guarantee a good title and to relieve the insured
from the necessity and responsibility of checking and examining public
records to determine the condition of the title to the land. Such purpose
would not be carried out if the interpretation of the policy urged by the
insurer were adopted. The court adopted the view of the Supreme Court of
Texas that "an insurance policy must be strictly construed against the
company writing it, and particularly of provisions which tend to defeat
coverage.""8
Burden of Proof. A first impression case construed the meaning of "con-
trol" in a fire insurance policy.86 Insured's house was vacant at the time a
water pipe froze and burst. Insured had moved out of state but had left
his brother-in-law in charge of the house. The brother-in-law listed the
house with a real estate agent, giving him a key, and also hired several
workmen, giving them access to the house. Prior to the accident the
brother-in-law had turned off the water and had opened several valves in
the water system to drain the remaining water. Insured asserted that, prior
to the date of the accident, some unknown person had reactivated the
water system.
The insurance policy in question was issued by a Lloyd's-type insurance
company and apparently was not a Texas Standard Homeowner's Policy.
Listed under a section called "Other Provisions," the policy contained a
provision reading: "Control of Property: This insurance shall not be preju-
diced by any act or neglect of any person (other than the named insured)
when such act or neglect is not within the control of the named insured."8
The "control" clause apparently was not an exclusion or exception to liabil-
ity in the policy but the court of civil appeals in reversing and remanding
the case gave it that effect by placing the burden of proof on the insured
to prove that the asserted unknown person who had turned the water
back on was not under his control. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
place the burden of proof upon the insured where the insurer specially
pleads exceptions or exclusions to general liability.88
Instead of being an exclusion or exception the "control" clause appears
to have been written for the benefit of insured. It states that the insured is
not responsible for the acts or neglect of others not under his control. This
appears to be another case misapplying rule 94. The result of this case ap-
pears contrary to a recent case construing the Texas Standard Homeown-
er's Policy which provides for loss by freezing but with an exclusion of loss
caused by freezing while the building is unoccupied unless the insured ex-
ercised "due diligence." 8 In that case the court's strict construction of the
policy required due diligence only by the insured, not of the insured's em-
ployee.
"
5National Sec. Life & Cas. Co. v. Davis, 152 Tex. 316, 257 S.W.2d 943 (1953).
" Fort Worth Lloyd's Ins. Co. v. Willham, 406 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref.
n.r.e.8 
Id. at 78.
88 TEx. R. Civ. P. 94.
8International Ins. Co. v. Reid, 400 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
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Ill. AUTOMOBILE AND LIABILITY INSURANCE
Legal Responsibility for Use of Automobile. In a case of first impression
in Texas, a court of civil appeals rejected the contention of an automobile
repairer that it was an insured under a provision in its customer's liability
policy which covered the auto owner and "Any other person or organiza-
tion legally responsible for the use of .. .an owned automobile."" The
auto owner had taken the car to Montgomery Ward for brake repair. Not
having time to fix the brakes that day, the service manager assured her
that the automobile could be safely driven until repairs could be made the
following day. While returning for service the next day, the owner had a
rear-end collision due to failure of her brakes. When the third party sued
the owner and Montgomery Ward, the insurer refused to defend Mont-
gomery Ward. The instant action was then instituted by Montgomery
Ward seeking a declaratory judgment that it was an assured within the
above-quoted clause. The court held that Montgomery Ward was not
legally responsible for the use of the vehicle by the insured and was not
covered by the policy. Any responsibility for Montgomery Ward's own
negligence does not make Montgomery Ward "legally responsible for the
use of the vehicle" within the meaning of the policy.
Uninsured Motorist. In a venue case" an insured was unable to make out
a prima facie case that an alleged third party tortfeasor was an "uninsured
motorist" in order to maintain his cause of action in the county where the
accident occurred. The third party, Cofer, was killed in the accident along
with the insured's wife and thirteen-year-old daughter. The court of civil
appeals, in a lengthy detailed examination of the facts, reversed the trial
court, holding that the evidence was insufficient to establish a prima facie
case that the alleged tortfeasor was an uninsured motorist. The court said
that, under the terms of the uninsured motorist endorsement, the insured
was required to prove by a preponderance of the admissible testimony that
the deceased, Cofer, was an uninsured motorist and that this was a condition
precedent to a cause of action under the terms of the endorsement. Testi-
mony that plaintiff had received negative replies upon writing to several
insurance companies to determine if Cofer had been insured by them was
held insufficient to satisfy the condition precedent. The case illustrates the
difficulty one may have finding whether there is insurance coverage when
the automobile owner is killed in the accident.
Ownership of Automobile by Minor. A named insured was held to be
the owner of an automobile for automobile liability purposes when the
insured held the certificate of title since, at the time of the accident, the
person for whom the automobile was purchased and who was paying for
the automobile was a minor and could not compel transfer and assignment
of legal title."a One of the cases relied upon by the court was a supreme
"
0 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 417 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967)
error ref.
'Pan Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Lloyd, 411 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
92 Cimmaron Ins. Co. v. Price, 409 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
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court decision holding that a person having the legal right to have the
title certificate to an automobile transferred to him was the "sole" owner
of the car under an insurance policy calling for such ownership."8 The court
applied the converse of the rule established in the supreme court case in
reaching its decision.
Extent of Permission for Use of Automobile. A court of civil appeals
held that permission by the named insured to another to use the insured
automobile gave rise to an implied permission for a third person to use the
insured automobile."' The existence of such implied permission entitles the
third person to protection under the "omnibus clause." Whether such im-
plied permission exists is usually a factual determination.
The named insured gave permission to a Catholic priest to use the in-
sured automobile for an out-of-town trip in connection with the priest's
duties as youth director. Nothing was said about who was to drive the car.
On previous similar occasions the priest had directed various youths under
his direction to drive the car. The accident occurred while a youth was
driving the car carrying out the instructions of the priest and executing
the purpose for which the car had been borrowed from the named insured.
The youth driving the car had a valid driver's license. His father's insur-
ance covered him as excess insurance if the insurance on the borrowed
automobile was primary insurance.
The court, relying upon an earlier Texas case9" and an annotation of
cases from other jurisdictions," held the evidence justified a finding that
the priest had the implied consent of the named insured to permit another
to drive the car on this occasion.
Extension of Liability Coverage to Devisee of Insured Owner. In a case
of first impression a court of civil appeals held there was automobile insur-
ance coverage of a devisee of an automobile."7 The devisee had "proper
temporary custody" of the automobile within the meaning of the decedent's
automobile policy. The policy provided that if the insured should die the
policy would cover any person having proper temporary custody of the
automobile until the appointment and qualification of the legal representa-
tive.
The insured automobile owner died leaving a will naming his aunt as
devisee of the automobile. The named executor turned the automobile over
"aPioneer Mut. Compensation Co. v. Diaz, 178 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943), aff'd,
142 Tex. 184, 177 S.W.2d 202 (1944). Important facts to sustain the holding that the insured
was the owner of the automobile were that the insured alone was obligated for the payment of the
encumbrance against the automobile held by a bank and that the person who was paying for the
car, the insured's minor brother-in-law, could use the car only by the permission of the insured
and could not acquire ownership of the automobile until he reimbursed the insured for the pur-
chase price of the automobile.
4 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 412 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
s' United Serv. Auto. Ass'n v. Zeller, 135 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error dismissed.
"Omnibus Clause of Automobile Liability Policy as Covering Accidents Caused by Third Per-
son Who is Using Car with Consent of Permittee of Named Insured, 4 A.L.R.3d 10 (1965).
" Atlantic Ins. Co. v. Fulfs, 417 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.
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to the aunt before the will was probated and before the executor qualified.
Prior to probate the automobile was demolished and the aunt injured.
The insurer denied any liability for collision damage and medical pay-
ments contending that the executor had not given the aunt "temporary
custody" but had turned the automobile over to her to keep permanently
because it was willed to her and would not be needed for payment of
debts. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment holding the aunt had
"proper temporary custody" within the meaning of the Texas Family Au-
tomobile Policy. Under the Probate Code the named executor not only has
the right to possession of the decedent's property but also the duty to ac-
quire such possession pending probate of the will. The aunt's possession was
temporary because it was subject to the executor's right to possession.
Accidental Death Benefits-Failure To Purchase Disability Coverage. An
example of strict construction in favor of the insurer rather than a liberal
construction in favor of the insured is found in the opinion of a court of
civil appeals in a case of first impression construing what is apparently an
unusual endorsement to an automobile policy. 8 The insured sought recov-
ery of $10,000 for the accidental death of his wife claiming coverage under
an endorsement in a family automobile policy which provided for death
indemnity benefits "provided the death shall occur (1) within ninety
days after the date of the accident or (2) within fifty-two weeks after
the date of the accident and during a period of continuous total disability
of the insured for which weekly indemnity is payable under the Total
Disability Coverage.' The insured had not purchased coverage for total
disability and paid no additional premium therefor. The accident occurred
August 22, 1964, and rendered the insured's wife totally disabled. She died
as a result of the accident on January 4, 1965. The appellate court held
that the quoted clause was not ambiguous and that it meant that, since
there was no total disability coverage, there could be no weekly indemnity
payable. The clause did not specifically require such payment.
It is submitted that the clause is ambiguous. A reasonable interpretation
of the clause is that the death benefit would be paid if death occurred
within fifty-two weeks after the date of accident and during a period of
continuous total disability of the insured under the circumstances for
which weekly indemnity would be payable if there was total disability
coverage. It would have been easy for the insurance company, when it
sold this accidental death coverage, to have written this clause to provide
that it applied only if there was also total disability coverage for an addi-
tional premium.
Oral Notice of Accident to Agent Does Not Discharge Policy Requirement
of Written Notice. A horrible example of the harsh operation of the law
requiring strict compliance with the policy requirements of notice is seen
in a case where there was timely oral notice on two occasions to the agent




who sold the insurance policy." No written notice was filed until more
than four months after the accident when the insured brought the matter
to her attorney. A severe consequence to the insured of the now established
rule that the notice requirement in an automobile policy is a condition
precedent to liability is that a failure to comply strictly with the policy
requirements invalidates the claim for indemnity regardless of whether
there is prejudice to the insurer because of the delay."1 In the instant case,
two days after the accident the insured went to the office of the insurer's
agent who sold her the policy to report the accident to him. The agent told
her he was engaged in a trial of a law suit and did not have time to talk
to her. The agent apparently did not even have time to give the insured
forms on which to report the accident. Eight days after the accident, in-
sured called the agent long distance from California, reported the accident
and claim to him in full, requested him to advise her of any additional
information needed in order for him to fully handle the claim, and received
the reply that the agent had all the information he needed and nothing
further would be required of her. The court held, "[N]evertheless the
policy provided for written notice and no notice was given for more than
four months after the accident, and we hold that as a matter of law, be-
cause of her failure to perform conditions precedent, or show a valid ex-
cuse for not doing so, appellee was not entitled to recover.' 0 2
It is submitted that this is an unduly strict and unjust application of the
law on notice. The facts show a valid excuse for the insured not filing a
written notice sooner than she did. She was first told by the insurer's agent
who was also an attorney that he was too busy in the trial of a law suit to
talk to her. She was not told by the agent to file a written notice. When she
went to the expense and trouble of calling the agent long distance from
California she was told that he had all the information he needed and
nothing further would be required of her. These facts are sufficient to show
both waiver and estoppel. An agent with authority to issue and collect
premiums for a policy certainly should have the authority to waive strict
compliance with the notice provision.
Seller's Insurer Not Liable When Equitable Title Has Passed. A court of
civil appeals held that the purchaser's insurer could not recover from the
seller's insurer on the theory that the purchaser did not have valid title to
the insured truck because of the failure of seller and purchaser to comply
with the Certificate of Title Act."3 The theory of the purchaser's insurer
was that the seller's insurer should be liable because the purchaser was using
the truck with permission of the seller and not as owner. The facts showed
that the parties intended that the sale of the truck take place on December
28, 1961. The accident occurred on December 30, 1961, while the purcha-
'Aetna Ins. Co. v. Durbin, 417 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
101 Klein v. Century Lloyds, 154 Tex. 160, 275 S.W.2d 95 (1955); New Amsterdam Cas. Co.
v. Hamblen, 144 Tex. 306, 190 S.W.2d 56 (1945); White v. Transit Cas. Co., 402 S.W.2d 212
(Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
1'2 417 S.W.2d at 487.
'Viator v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 411 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.
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ser was driving the truck. The decision is sound since the legislative intent
of the Certificate of Title Act is to prevent or lessen theft and traffic in sto-
len motor vehicles; not to prevent sales and transfers of interest in motor
vehicles.' 4
Burden on Insurer To Prove Insured Truck Was Used on "Regular or Fre-
quent Trips" Beyond a 1 50-Mile Radius. The meaning of "regular or fre-
quent trips in an automobile policy wherein the insured warranted that no
regular or frequent trips of his trucks would be made to any location be-
yond a 150-mile radius was considered by a court of civil appeals." 5 The
insured truck had been used during the nine-month period for his farming
operations within the 150-mile limit except for eight trips beyond the 150-
mile limit.
The court held that the burden was upon the insurer to prove that the
truck was used on "regular" and "frequent" trips beyond the 150-mile
limit. Eight trips in the nine-month period was not sufficient as a matter of
law to defeat the insured's right to recovery.
The opinion improperly placed the burden of proof on the insurer if the
court is correct in calling the 150-mile limit an "exclusionary" provision. "
However, the provision itself is in terms of a promissory warranty by the
insured and the burden is on the insured to prove such a breach of war-
ranty.'
0 7
Seven of the trips were made by a lessee while the truck was under lease.
The court said the insurer would not be liable for loss during these trips
because of a provision of the policy that "This policy does not apply: ...
if the automobile is or at any time becomes subject to any bailment lease,
conditional sale, purchase agreement, mortgage or other encumbrance not
specifically declared and described in this policy.' 00 This interpretation is
doubtful as the quoted provision applies to title encumbrances and not to
lease of the automobile for use.
Insurer as Beneficial Owner of Insured's Claim Against Third Party. De-
fendant hit insured's car while it was parked, damaging it to the extent of
$333.10. He paid the insured $100, the amount of the deductible on in-
sured's policy. The insurer paid insured the balance. The tortfeasor was
then sued by the insurer in the name of the insured. The insured testified
that she did not make any claim for damages against the defendant and
did not want a judgment against the defendant. The court of civil appeals
rendered judgment for the insurer on the theory that the insurer was the
beneficial owner of the cause of action, could sue in the name of the in-
sured and the fact the insured had no claim against the defendant was im-
material.' One wonders about the principle that only real parties in inter-
est may participate as parties in a suit.
1"Motor Inv. Co. v. Knox City, 141 Tex. 530, 532, 174 S.W.2d 482, 483 (1943).
'O'Emmco Ins. Co. v. Waters, 413 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.
'0" TEx. R. Clv. P. 94.Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Whisenant, 245 S.W. 963 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922)
error ref. n.r.e.
'0'413 S.W.2d at 486.
"'Jaskolski v. Jahn, 410 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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